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The NFL Concussion Litigation: A Critical
Assessment of Class Certification
*

Sheila B. Scheuerman
INTRODUCTION

Charles (“Ray”) Easterling, starting safety for the Atlanta Falcons in the 1970s, would forget the way home when jogging through
1
his neighborhood. He would walk into a room and forget why he was
2
3
there. He would experience severe mood swings and depression. In
4
August 2011, Easterling filed one of the first lawsuits against the National Football League (NFL), asserting that the NFL concealed the
long-term effects of on-field head injury and failed to warn players of
5
the risks of harm from repeated concussions. As of October 2, 2012,
more than 155 similar cases on behalf of thousands of former players
have been consolidated in a multi-district litigation case (MDL) in
6
federal district court in Pennsylvania. The consolidated mega-case
seeks, among other things, to certify a national class of “[a]ll retired or
former NFL professional football players who reside in the United
States, who are not now salaried employees of the NFL or any mem*
Director of Faculty Development & Scholarship, and Professor of Law, Charleston
School of Law. I would like to thank Anthony J. Franze and Jeffrey Karlin for their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. In addition, I am grateful to Charleston School of
Law librarian William R. Gaskill for his invaluable research assistance. Finally, I would like to
thank Stephanie Brown and Megan White for their research and citation assistance. Errors and
omissions are mine alone.
1
Mary Ann Easterling, NFL’s Head Injury Denial Failed My Husband, USA TODAY, Aug.
15, 2012, at 7A.
2
Joseph A. Slobodzian, Concussion Suits Have NFL, Ex-Players On Collision Course,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 29, 2012, at A1.
3
Mike Tierney, Football Player Who Killed Himself Had Brain Disease, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2012, at B16.
4
Easterling later committed suicide on April 19, 2012. E.g., Tierney, supra note 3. The
autopsy of Easterling’s brain found that he suffered from moderately severe chronic traumatic
encephalopathy. Id.; see also infra Part II.
5
Class Action Complaint, Easterling v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:11-CV-05209-AB
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Easterling Complaint].
6
Plaintiffs/Former Players, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, http://nflconcussionlitigation.
com/?page_id=274 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013); see also In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012).
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ber club, and who have not filed a personal injury action for latent
7
brain injury.”
In the pantheon of high-stakes class actions, the personal injury
8
class action has long been considered dead. Too many individual issues, such as causation and medical history, doom the typical personal
9
injury case. The NFL Players seek to avoid this problem by asserting
class claims only for “medical monitoring,” a novel theory that allows
asymptomatic plaintiffs to recover anticipated costs of medical exami10
nations.
The problem, however, is that a medical monitoring claim presents its own individual issues. Not all states recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action, and even among those that do, the ele11
ments vary. Like a negligence claim, a medical monitoring claim pre12
sents individualized causation issues. In addition, testing and treat13
ment plans can vary from patient to patient.
Part I of this essay describes the “NFL concussion” litigation.
Part II provides a brief overview of the science. Part III examines the
current standards for class certification, and Part IV applies these
standards to the medical monitoring class claims brought by the NFL
Players. Part IV notes the courts’ uncertainty on whether medical
monitoring class actions should be treated as an injunctive class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or as a damages class under
14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Regardless of which category medical monitoring falls into, Part IV concludes that the players’
medical monitoring claim as currently pled fails to satisfy the criteria
for class certification. This does not mean that these plaintiffs have no
redress against the NFL. It means only that the NFL Players need to
employ the traditional personal injury lawsuit—not the class action
device—to pursue their relief.

7
Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Class Action Complaint for Medical Monitoring ¶ 16,
In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No.
2323 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012) [hereinafter Master Class Action Complaint], ECF No. 84.
8
See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
(2007); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “certification of mass tort litigation classes has been disfavored.”).
9
See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (discussing problems
of satisfying Rule 23(b)(3) where plaintiffs alleged exposure to asbestos caused harm).
10 E.g., D. Scott Anderson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1096-97 (2005).
11 E.g., id. at 1114-17; see also discussion infra Part IV.
12 See sources cited infra notes 222-26.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part IV.
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I. THE LAWSUITS
15

Suits about concussions are not new. The first concussion lawsuit involving a professional football player was filed sixteen years ago
by Merril Hoge, a former running back for the Pittsburgh Steelers and
16
the Chicago Bears. In 1996, Hoge filed a medical malpractice action
17
against Dr. John Munsell, the team physician. Hoge claimed that Dr.
Munsell failed to warn him about the risks of returning to the game
18
too quickly after a concussion. After a two-week trial in June 2000,
19
the jury awarded Hoge $1.55 million in damages.

15 “[T]here is no universal agreement on the [medical] definition of a concussion.” Robert
C. Cantu, Return to Play Guidelines After a Head Injury, 17 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 45, 52
(1998). Generally speaking, however, a concussion is a traumatically induced alteration in brain
function. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 90-94; see generally CHRISTOPHER
NOWINSKI, HEAD GAMES – FOOTBALL’S CONCUSSION CRISIS FROM THE NFL TO YOUTH
LEAGUES 24-25 (2007). Concussions are prevalent in football and boxing, which both involve
violent contact, but can occur in all major sports. See Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., The Epidemiology of Sports-Related Concussion, 30 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 1, 3-5 (2011) (reporting concussion rates for football, baseball, basketball, cheerleading, ice and field hockey, and soccer). In
2011, for example, eleven Major League Baseball players were placed on the disabled list due to
concussions and head injuries. Jon Paul Morosi, MLB Gets Stringent with Concussions, FOX
SPORTS (June 15, 2012, 10:03 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/mlb-gets-tough-withconcussions-7-day-disabled-list-designed-to-protect-players-061412.
16 Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The
Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL. J. SPORT L. 17, 26 (2002). Hoge recently created controversy
when he said it was “irresponsible” to suggest that football was a dangerous game for children.
Michael David Smith, Merril Hoge: Kurt Warner Is Uneducated and Irresponsible, NBC SPORTS
(May 4, 2012, 4:58 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/05/04/merril-hoge-kurtwarner-is-uneducated-and-irresponsible/.
17 Hecht, supra note 16, at 27. Hoge’s suit was the first by a professional football player.
See id. at 30. Similarly, in March 2010, a former player in the Arena Football League filed a
malpractice action against the Colorado Crush’s team doctor. E.g., Alan Schwarz, Lawsuit Cites
Mishandling of Football Concussion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at B17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/sports/football/19concussions.html?_r=0.
18 Hecht, supra note 16, at 21. This risk can include “Second Impact Syndrome,” where a
second blow to the brain causes the athlete to suffer brain stem failure, resulting in respiratory
failure and sometimes death. E.g., Robert C. Cantu, Second-Impact Syndrome, 17 CLINICS IN
SPORTS MED. 37, 37-44 (1998). Hoge suffered a concussion during a preseason game in August
1994 against the Kansas City Chiefs. Hecht, supra note 16, at 26; see also John Mangels, Players
Say NFL Ignored Dangers of Concussions, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 27, 2012, at A1.
“Five days later, without a neurological exam, a doctor cleared him by phone to play.” Mangels,
supra note 18. At an October 2nd game against the Buffalo Bills, Hoge suffered a second concussion and stopped breathing. Id. After this concussion, Hoge had to keep his home phone
number in his wallet in case he forgot how to get home. Peter Kerasotis, Hoge’s Story Should Be
Warning to NFL, FLORIDA TODAY, Mar. 20, 2011. Less than two weeks later, Hoge retired from
the NFL. Hecht, supra note 16, at 27.
19 Hecht, supra note 16, at 28-29. The parties subsequently settled the lawsuit for undisclosed terms. Schwarz, supra note 17. For a thorough discussion of the Hoge case, see Hecht,
supra note 16, at 25-30, and Daniel J. Kain, “It’s Just A Concussion:” The National Football
League’s Denial of A Casual Link Between Multiple Concussions And Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 697, 713-17 (2008).
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What is new in concussion litigation is the defendant. Players are
no longer bringing individual medical malpractice suits against team
20
physicians; instead, they are suing the NFL itself. In July 2011, more
than seventy former NFL players and their spouses filed the first law21
22
suit against the NFL in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Despite the large number of plaintiffs, the suit was not brought as a class
23
action.
This first case, however, opened the doors. Courts across the
24
country were inundated with no less than 155 suits, including twelve
25
class actions. While the class actions all essentially sought to represent the same putative class of former players, the class complaints
26
varied in significant respects. Some class complaints asserted claims

20 E.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, In re Nat’l
Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2012), ECF
No. 2642. At least one case also has named the individual clubs as defendants. E.g., Complaint,
Woods v. NFL, No. 12-10107 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 26, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3802438 (naming
Miami Dolphins, Detroit Lions, Buffalo Bills, Philadelphia Eagles and Tennessee Titans as defendants).
21 Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, ¶¶ 1-85, Maxwell v. Nat’l
Football League, No. BC 465 842 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Maxwell Complaint].
The complaint named the National Football League, as well as NFL Properties, LLC, as defendants. In addition, the complaint named various defendants related to Riddell, Inc., a helmet
manufacturer. The complaint brought products liability – design defect, manufacturing defect,
failure to warn, and negligence – claims against the Riddell defendants. See id. ¶¶ 567-586.
22 The NFL, with the consent of the Riddell defendants, successfully removed the action to
the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Transfer and Coordination
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 at 2, In re Nat’l Football League Litig., MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. Nov.
15, 2011). The defendants argued that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
completely preempted plaintiffs’ claims. Id. This argument also forms the basis of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Memorandum of Law of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL
Properties LLC In Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Admin. Long-Form
Complaint on Preemption Grounds, In re Nat’l Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No.
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 3589.
23 See generally Maxwell Complaint, supra note 21. Lead plaintiff Vernon Maxwell played
professional football for six seasons, and suffered multiple concussions during his pro career. Id.
¶¶ 150-51. The Complaint alleged that Maxwell suffers from various symptoms including memory loss and headaches. Id. ¶ 153. The Maxwell Complaint alleged that the NFL breached its
duty to protect its players by failing to warn players of the risks of repeated concussions, id., and
by failing to institute rules preventing a player from returning to play after a concussive blow.
Id. ¶¶ 533, 548. The Maxwell Complaint further alleged that “[f]or decades, Defendants have
known that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term brain injury,” but that the NFL
“made . . . material misrepresentations . . . that there was no link between concussions and later
life cognitive/brain injury.” Id. ¶¶ 113, 124-25, 556. The Maxwell plaintiffs brought causes of
action for negligence, “negligent-monopolist,” fraud and loss of consortium against the NFL. See
generally id.
24 Plaintiffs/Former Players, supra note 6.
25 See discussion infra Part I.A.
26 See discussion infra Part I.A.
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27

for negligence and fraud, while others brought only medical monitor28
ing claims. The class complaints further differed in whether class certification was sought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)
29
or 23(b)(3). Ultimately, the number of cases grew so large that the
cases were consolidated into a federal multidistrict litigation where
30
plaintiffs filed a master class action complaint.
A. The Complaints
The first class action against the NFL was filed in August 2011 by
Charles Easterling in the United States District Court for the Eastern
31
District of Pennsylvania. The complaint asserted claims for negli32
gence, civil conspiracy, concealment, and medical monitoring. The
Easterling complaint sought certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) of a nationwide class of all former NFL players
who sustained a concussion while playing in the NFL and who have,
33
since retirement, developed physical or mental problems as a result.
On the medical monitoring claim, the Easterling complaint expanded
the class to include current players and future players who suffer a
34
concussion or “concussion like symptoms” and also sought certifica35
tion under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).

27 E.g., Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, And Demand for
Jury Trial, Jacobs v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9345 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011).
28 E.g., Class Action Complaint, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League, No. 1:12-CV-20269-JEM
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2012).
29 See discussion infra Part I.A.
30 NFL Asks Federal Judge to Dismiss Concussion Lawsuits, NFL.COM (Aug. 30, 2012 9:52
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000056716/article/nfl-asks-federal-judge-to-dismissconcussion-lawsuits; see also Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7.
31 Easterling Complaint, supra note 5.
32 See generally id.
33 Id. ¶¶ 31-34. The complaint further divided the class into five sub-classes based on the
time period in which the player was employed by a member team. Id.
34 Id. ¶ 59.
35 Id.
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A wave of similar class action complaints followed. Two were
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
37
New York. These complaints, by putative class representatives Harry
38
Jacobs and Reginald Rucker, brought identical class action allegations; each sought certification of a nationwide class of former professional football players “who were employed by any member club” of
39
the NFL. The Rucker complaint brought class claims under theories
40
of fraud and medical monitoring, while the Jacobs complaint addi41
tionally asserted a negligence class claim. Both sought certification
42
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
43
Three more class action suits were filed in January 2012. One
complaint filed by Andrew Glover, who played for the Raiders, Vi44
kings, and Saints over his ten-year career, used the identical class action allegations and claims set forth in the Jacobs and Rucker com45
plaints. Like the Rucker and Jacobs complaints, Glover sought class
46
certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The other complaint, by Ron Solt,

36 See Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, and Demand for
Jury Trial, Rucker v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9538 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter
Rucker Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, and Demand
for Jury Trial, Jacobs v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9345 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Jacobs Complaint]; Class Action and Individual Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial, Glover
v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00287-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter
Glover Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint, Solt v. Nat’l Football
League, No. 2:12-CV-00262-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Solt Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League, No. 1:12-CV-20269-JEM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2012) [hereinafter Wooden Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial,
Hughes v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00459 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Hughes Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, Brooks v. Nat’l
Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00941 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Brooks Complaint];
Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12CV-01034 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Jackson Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and
Request for Jury Trial, Granger v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-01303 (E.D. La. May 18,
2012) [hereinafter Granger Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, LeMaster v. Nat’l Football
League, No.120302540 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter LeMaster Complaint];
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Haddix v. Nat’l Football League, No. L-136312 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Haddix Complaint].
37 See Jacobs Complaint; supra note 36; Rucker Complaint, supra note 36.
38 Compare Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 15-20, with Rucker Complaint, supra note
36, ¶¶ 84-89.
39 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 16; Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 85.
40 Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 97-111.
41 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, at Count III.
42 Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 84; Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 15.
43 E.g., Wooden Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Jan. 24, 2012); Solt Complaint, supra note
36 (filed Jan. 18, 2012); Glover Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Jan. 19, 2012).
44 Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 13.
45 Compare Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 84-89, with Jacobs Complaint, supra note
36, ¶¶ 15-20, and Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 84-89.
46 Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 84.
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a former offensive lineman for the Indianapolis Colts and the Phila47
delphia Eagles, started with the same class definition of “all retired or
former professional football players in the United States who were
48
employed by any member club” of the NFL, but identified three sub49
50
classes: the Non-Concussion Subclass, the Symptomatic Subclass,
51
and the Concussion Subclass. Solt sought certification under all
52
three categories of class action: Rules 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
The third class action filed in January 2012, Wooden v. NFL, originally
53
defined a limited class focused on second-impact syndrome, but later
revised the class definition to the now-standard, “[a]ll retired or for54
mer professional football players in the United States.” Wooden as55
serted only a medical monitoring claim on behalf of the class and did
56
not identify the specific type of class action asserted.
At least one concussion-related class action was filed against the
57
NFL per month from February to May 2012. Three federal complaints—Jackson v. NFL, Brooks v. NFL, and Granger v. NFL—
defined the class as “[a]ll persons, and spouses of persons, who sustained one or more concussions, or suffered concussion like symptoms,
while playing in an NFL football game and who has developed or will
develop mental or physical problems as a result of the concussions or
47

Solt Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 41.
49 Id. ¶ 42. The Non-Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll other Class members who are
asymptomatic and did not sustain any concussion while playing football in the NFL, as determined by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole.” Id.
50 Id. ¶ 43. The Symptomatic Subclass included:
[a]ll Class members who suffered and/or presently suffer from conditions and/or symptoms
as a result of one or more concussion(s), or from concussion-like symptoms and/or concussion-related conditions from repetitive traumatic brain injury, such conditions and/or symptoms including concentration problems, memory loss, mood swings, personality changes,
headache, fatigue, dizziness, insomnia and excessive drowsiness; episodic disorientation; lack
of insight, poor judgment, poor to little impulse control; signs and symptoms of Parkinson’s
Disease or Alzheimer’s Disease (and other conditions that discovery may reveal are related)
from their playing football in the NFL.
Id.
51 Id. ¶ 44. The Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll Class members who are asymptomatic
but have sustained one or more concussion(s), as determined by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole, while playing football in the NFL.” Id.
52 Id. ¶ 40.
53 Wooden Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 18.
54 Amended Complaint – Class and Mass Action ¶ 889, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League,
2:12-CV-01037 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Amended Wooden Complaint].
55 Id. ¶¶ 958-68.
56 Id. ¶ 964 (seeking certification “[p]ursuant to Rule 23”).
57 See Hughes Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Feb. 17, 2012); LeMaster Complaint, supra
note 36 (filed Mar. 21, 2012); Haddix Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Mar. 21, 2012); Jackson
Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Apr. 23, 2012); Granger Complaint, supra note 36 (filed May 18,
2012).
48
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58

concussion like symptoms.” This definition thus encompassed both
59
former and current players. Brooks, Granger, and Jackson asserted
60
only a medical monitoring claim on behalf of the class and sought
61
certification under both Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). A fourth federal
complaint, Hughes v. NFL, used a class definition essentially identical
62
to the Easterling complaint. Hughes invoked both Rules 23(b)(2)
63
and (b)(3) in support of class certification. One of the class action
complaints was filed in state court but removed to federal court by the
64
NFL. This complaint, LeMaster v. NFL, essentially used the same
class definition as the Solt case, but limited the class to Pennsylvania
65
residents: “[a]ll retired or former professional football players domiciled in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who were employed by
66
any member club” of the NFL. Like the Solt Complaint, the LeMaster Complaint identified three sub-classes: the Non-Concussion Sub67
68
69
class, the Symptomatic Subclass, and the Concussion Subclass.

58 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 122; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 130;
Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 106.
59 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 185; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 209.
60 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 179-85; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 198209; Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 163-69.
61 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 122; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 130;
Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 106.
62 Compare Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115, with Easterling Complaint, supra note
5, ¶ 34. The Hughes Complaint defined the class as “[a]ll persons, and spouses of persons, who
sustained one or more concussions, or suffered concussion like symptoms, while playing in an
NFL football game and who has developed or will develop mental or physical problems as a
result of the concussions or concussion like symptoms.” Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115.
63 Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115.
64 See Docket, LeMaster v. Nat’l Football League, No. 120302540 (Phila. Ct. Comm. Pl.
Mar. 21, 2012) (noting Notice of Removal by National Football League filed on May 7, 2012). A
second class action complaint was filed during this time period in New Jersey state court. See
Haddix Complaint, supra note 36. The Haddix case was removed to federal court and transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to
the MDL Order. See Conditional Transfer Order (CTO-12), In re Nat’l Football League Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. June 14, 2012); see also infra Part I.B. In the
MDL, the Haddix plaintiffs subsequently dropped the class allegations from their short form
complaints. Short Form Complaints, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., No. 2:12-CV-03532-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF Nos. 2-4 (filed by Gregory Brown,
Lawrence Watkins and Michael Haddix, lead plaintiffs in the state class action).
65 Compare LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 22-25, with Solt Complaint, supra note
36, ¶¶ 41-44.
66 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 22.
67 Id. ¶ 23. The Non-Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll other Class members who are
asymptomatic and did not sustain any concussion while playing football in the NFL, as determined by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole.” Id.
68 Id. ¶ 25. The Symptomatic Subclass included:

[a]ll Class members who suffered and/or presently suffer from conditions and/or symptoms
as a result of one or more concussion(s), or from concussion-like symptoms and/or concussion-related conditions from repetitive traumatic brain injury, such conditions and/or symp-
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LeMaster invoked the state-law equivalents of Rules 23(b)(2) and
70
(b)(3).
B.

The MDL & Master Administrative Complaint

Facing these multiple class actions as well as thousands of individual claims, the NFL filed a motion to consolidate the concussion
cases with the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
71
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. With little analysis, the Panel granted
72
the NFL’s motion. With Solt, Glover, and Easterling already pending
before Judge Anita Brody of the United States District Court for the
73
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Panel centralized the MDL be74
fore Judge Brody. The MDL now involves over 4,000 players in over
75
200 complaints.
76
Pursuant to a case management order, plaintiffs filed two master
77
administrative complaints, one for individual claims and the other a
78
class action for medical monitoring. The new master class action
complaint (“Master Class Complaint”) included all eleven of the
79
separate class actions, as well as a new class action led by putative
class representative Gerald Allen, a former running back for the Bal80
timore Colts and Washington Redskins. The apparent purpose of the
toms including concentration problems, memory loss, mood swings, personality changes,
headache, fatigue, dizziness, insomnia and excessive drowsiness; episodic disorientation;
lack of insight, poor judgment, poor to little impulse control; signs and symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease or Alzheimer’s Disease (and other conditions that discovery may reveal are
related) from their playing football in the NFL.
Id.
69 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 24. The Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll Class
members who are asymptomatic but have sustained one or more concussion(s), as determined
by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole, while playing football in the NFL.”
Id.
70 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 21-25 (citing Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1708(a) & (b)).
71 Section 1407 allows consolidation for pretrial proceedings where pending civil actions in
different districts involve “one or more common questions of fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
72 Order, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323AB, MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 1.
73 See sources cited supra note 36.
74 See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1378
(J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012).
75 See generally Plaintiffs/Former Players, supra note 6.
76 Case Management Order No. 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2012), ECF No. 64.
77 Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, In re Nat’l Football League
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012),
ECF No. 83.
78 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7.
79 See discussion supra Part I.A.
80 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 5.
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Master Class Complaint is to identify appropriate class representa81
tives for both a national class as well as two state-wide classes.
82
Unlike the original class complaints, the Master Class Complaint
83
asserts a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) only.
The complaint alleges six common questions of law or fact that warrant class certification: liability on a claim for medical monitoring; defendant’s affirmative defenses; causation; “[w]hether medical monitoring is reasonably necessary for members of the Class to obtain early
diagnosis of latent brain injury;” “[w]hether such monitoring is beyond the routine medical care provided to men of a similar age as
members of the Classes;” and “[w]hether early diagnosis of latent
brain injury will lead to improved treatment for the medical, cognitive,
84
psychological and behavioral sequelae of the latent brain injury.”
The class identifies a “national class,” defined as “[a]ll retired or former NFL professional football players who reside in the United
States, who are not now salaried employees of the NFL or any member club, and who have not filed a personal injury action for latent
85
brain injury.” Alternatively, the Master Class Complaint defines two
86
state class actions for California and Florida residents.
The Master Class Complaint asserts an independent medical
87
monitoring claim under New York law on behalf of the national class.
The class seeks an “injunction creating a Court-supervised NFLfunded comprehensive medical monitoring program for the Plaintiffs
88
and the members of the Class,” in the form of a trust fund. Additionally, the complaint brings a fraudulent concealment/negligent omission
89
claim and seeks medical monitoring as a remedy.
II. THE SCIENCE
In simplest terms, a concussion occurs when external force causes
90
the brain to hit the skull inducing an alteration in brain function.

81

Id. ¶¶ 5-9.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
83 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 15.
84 Id. ¶ 22.
85 Id. ¶ 16.
86 Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
87 Id. ¶¶ 233-44.
88 Id. ¶¶ 242-44.
89 Id. ¶¶ 245-57.
90 See Cantu, supra note 15, at 52; Sarah Cobb & Barbara Battin, Second-Impact Syndrome, 20 J. SCH. NURSING 262, 262 (2004) ; see generally NOWINSKI, supra note 15, at 24-25.
82
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Loss of consciousness is not required for a concussion to occur. Neurological exams, such as magnetic resonance imaging or electroen92
cephalograms, typically do not detect a concussion. Rather, diagnos93
ticians must rely on clinical symptoms such as dizziness or nausea.
Many use the “Cantu grading system”, developed by Dr. Robert C.
Cantu, co-founder of the Sports Legacy Institute, which categorizes
concussions based on whether the player loses consciousness and suf94
fers amnesia.
When the brain experiences frequent trauma, Chronic Traumatic
95
Encephalopathy (CTE) may occur in the brain. CTE is a neurodegenerative disease caused by the accumulation of naturally occurring
tau proteins in individual nerve cells thereby preventing the cells from
96
connecting with other nerve cells and eventually “killing the cells.”
In simpler terms, the tau proteins operate “sort of like sludge, which
97
clogs up the brain cell.” Dr. Ann McKee, a leading researcher on
CTE, has developed a four-tier grading system for CTE:
In Grade 1, a few hot spots appear on the surface, clustered
around small blood vessels . . . . In Grade 2, the spots multiply but
most brain tissue is undisturbed . . . . In Grade 3, the neurofibulary tangles she likens to skeins of unraveling yarn invade multiple lobes of the brain. Besieged, the medial temporal lobe atrophies. The hippocampus, essential for memory and learning, is attacked. The amygdale, which governs aggressiveness and rage, is
assaulted . . . . Grade 4, a more florid form of Grade 3, is gener98
ally only seen in those who live with the disease longer.
Clinically, CTE presents cognitive, mood, and behavioral symp99
toms. Initially called “punch drunk syndrome” because of its associa91 Mark Aubry, et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the First International Conference on Concussion in Sport, Vienna 2001, 36 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 6, 6 (2002), available at
http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/36/1/6.full; accord Cobb & Battin, supra note 90, at 263.
92 Cobb & Battin, supra note 90, at 262. Indeed, after a concussion, “brain scans are [usually] normal because the injury is metabolic rather than structural.” Id.
93 Id. at 262-63.
94 Cantu, supra note 15, at 53-56.
95 Robert C. Cantu, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in the National Football League, 61
NEUROSURGERY 223, 223-24 (2007).
96 Legal Issues Relating to Football Helmet Injuries (Part I & II): Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1, 153 (2010) (statement of Dr. Ann C. McKee) [hereinafter
Helmet Injuries Hearings]; see also id. at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert Cantu).
97 Id. at 212 (statement of Dr. Julian Bailes).
98 Jane Leavy, The Woman Who Would Save Football, GRANTLAND (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/8218700/neuropathologist-dr-ann-mckee-accused-killingfootball-be-sport-only-hope.
99 Cantu, supra note 95, at 223-24; accord Christine M. Baugh et al., Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy: Neurodegeneration Following Repetitive Concussive and Subconcussive Brain
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tion with boxers, CTE was first described in 1928 by Dr. Harrison S.
100
Dr. Martland described the
Martland, a New Jersey pathologist.
“punch drunk” boxer as exhibiting “slight mental confusion,” “un101
steadiness in gait,” “hesitancy in speech,” and “tremors of the hands.”
He further noted that, in later stages, symptoms “often mimic those
102
seen in diseases characterized by the parkinsonian syndrome.” Although he could not prove his theory, Dr. Martland attributed these
degenerative effects to “degenerative progressive lesions” in the brain
103
caused by single or repeated blows to the head.
Studies in the 1950s and 1960s confirmed Martland’s earlier find104
ings. By 1952, moreover, the medical community was recognizing
that sub-concussive impacts also had the potential to cause brain
105
damage. That same year, Dr. Augustus Thorndike, a Harvard surgeon, issued a medical study addressing college sports injuries, and
recommended that football players who had been knocked uncon106
scious even once should stop playing the game. As of 2009, medical
literature described 49 cases of CTE since 1928, “39 of whom were
107
boxers.”
In part, the rather limited number of diagnosed cases over that
seventy-year period may have reflected the difficulty of diagnosing
CTE. “Differential diagnosis of most cases of moderate-severe de108
mentia is difficult just based on current presentation.” Rather, CTE
109
can be diagnosed only post-mortem. Although symptoms are similar
to other neurodegenerative diseases, CTE is pathologically distinct
from other diseases including Alzheimer’s disease and Frontotempo110
ral Lobar Degeneration. In 1973, Dr. J. A. N. Corsellis identified the

Trauma, EPUB at 3 (May 3, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/cste/files/2012/05/
Baugh_Chronic-Traumatic-Encephalopathy_2012.pdf.
100 Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103 (1928); see also A.
H. ROBERTS, BRAIN DAMAGE IN BOXERS 13 (1969) (describing Martland’s work in this area).
101 Martland, supra note 100, at 1103.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Ewald W. Busse & Albert J. Silverman, Electroencephalographic Changes in Professional Boxers, 149 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1522, 1522 (1952). See generally ROBERTS, supra note 100
(discussing results of study of traumatic encephalopathy in British boxers).
105 See Busse & Silverman, supra note 104, at 1522 (noting that “[i]f the trauma is . . . mild
but repeated at intervals that do not permit the brain to return to normal functioning, permanent
damage may result”).
106 Augustus Thorndike, Serious Recurrent Injuries of Athletes – Contraindications to Further Competitive Participation, 247 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 554, 555-56 (1952).
107 Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, SPORTS LEGACY INSTITUTE, http://sportslegacy.org/
research/what-is-cte/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
108 Baugh, supra note 99, at 3.
109 Id. at 6, 9.
110 Id. at 2.
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neuropathology of CTE in four different portions of the brain by ex111
Specifically,
amining the brain tissue of fifteen deceased boxers.
Corsellis noted neurofibrillary tangles spread diffusely through both
112
the cerebral cortex and the brainstem.
In 2005, Dr. Bennet Omalu, a forensic pathologist at the Univer113
sity of Pittsburgh, identified the first documented case of CTE in a
114
former professional football player. In this study, Dr. Omalu examined the brain tissue of Hall of Fame offensive lineman “Iron Mike”
115
116
Webster and found tau protein buildup characteristic of CTE. In
2006, Dr. Omalu confirmed a second case of CTE in a professional
football player, Terry Long, a former player for the Pittsburgh
117
And in
Steelers, who committed suicide by drinking anti-freeze.
2007, Omalu diagnosed CTE in a third former football player, Andre
Waters, a former defensive back for the Philadelphia Eagles and Ari118
zona Cardinals. In a telephone interview, Dr. Omalu told the New
York Times that “brain trauma ‘is the significant contributory factor’
119
to Mr. Waters’s brain damage.”

111

J.A.N. Corsellis et al., The Aftermath of Boxing, 3 PSYCHOL. MED. 270 (1973).
Id. at 296.
113 E.g., Alan Schwarz, Expert Ties Ex-Player’s Suicide to Brain Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2007, at A1.
114 Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128 (2005).
115 Webster played center for the Pittsburgh Steelers for fourteen years, and earned the
nickname “Iron Mike” by “playing six straight seasons without missing an offensive down.” Art
Carey, Big Men of the NFL Pay for Their Play Later in Life, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 27, 2003; see
also
Webster’s
Estate
Triumphs,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Dec.
15,
2006),
http://seattletimes.com/html/sports/2003478503_nfl15.html (same); Hard Knocks That Can Last a
Lifetime, POST-CRESCENT, Nov. 28, 2010 (describing Webster’s career as a “star offensive lineman”).
116 Omalu, supra note 114, at 128; see also Cantu, supra note 95, at 223. Webster’s estate
subsequently sued the National Football League for disability benefits under the League’s retirement plan. See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 Fed. Appx.
305 (4th Cir. 2006). A federal judge awarded Webster’s family over $1 million. See Don Markus,
Ex-Redskin Player Sues for Added Disability Payments, BALT. SUN (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-29/news/bs-md-shelton-nfl-suit-20101129_1_disabilitydoug-ell-cy-smith (reporting Webster’s family received $1.2 million in disability payments); Michael
Leahy,
The
Pain
Game,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
30,
2008),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-03/news/36840014_1_pain-pills-pain-game-surgeries
(reporting award of $1.5 million); see also Brett Edwin LoVellette, Comment, “Mortal [K]ombat
in Cleats”: An Examination of the Effectiveness of the National Football League’s Disability Plan
and Its Impact on Retired Players, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1101, 1127-33 (2009) (describing Webster’s
quest for disability benefits).
117 Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
League Player: Part II, 59 NEUROSURGERY 1086 (2006); see also Cantu, supra note 95, at 223.
118 See Cantu, supra note 95, at 223.
119 Schwarz, supra note 113.
112
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A 2005 study by the Center for the Study of Retired Athletes at
120
the University of North Carolina corroborated Dr. Omalu’s findings.
Dr. Kevin M. Guskiewicz surveyed more than 2,500 former players
and found that retired NFL players who had a history of three or
more concussions were five times more likely to develop “mild cognitive impairment,” and three times more likely to experience “significant memory problems” when compared to retirees without a history
121
of concussions. Another survey by Dr. Guskiewicz in 2007 found
that “football players with three or more concussions are at a threefold risk for sustaining future concussions, and subsequently three
122
times more likely to be diagnosed with clinical depression.”
In 2008, Boston University Medical School partnered with the
Sports Legacy Institute to create the Center for the Study of Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy (“Center”), which is dedicated to conduct123
ing research on CTE. Between February 2008 and June 2010, the
124
Center analyzed the brains of twelve professional football players.
125
All twelve showed evidence of CTE. To date, 93% of the professional football players’ brains tested by the Center have been diag126
nosed with CTE.
Still, not all former professional football players have exhibited
127
symptoms of CTE; Associate Justice Byron “Whizzer” White is a
128
notable example. Predicting CTE is difficult. Presently, CTE cannot
120 See Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Association Between Recurrent Concussion and LateLife Cognitive Impairment in Retired Professional Football Players, 57 NEUROSURGERY 719
(2005).
121 Id.
122 Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Recurrent Concussion and Risk of Depression in Retired
Professional Football Players, MED. & SCI. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE 903, 906 (2007). For an overview of the competing studies sponsored by the NFL, see Michelle Modery, Injury Time-Out:
Justifying Workers’ Compensation Awards to Retired Athletes With Concussion-Caused Dementia,
84 TEMPLE L. REV. 247, 265-67 (2011).
123 See BU CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHRONIC TRAUMATIC ENCEPHALOPATHY,
http://www.bu.edu/cste/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
124 Brandon E. Gavett et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: A Potential Late Effect of
Sport-Related Concussive and Subconcussive Head Trauma, 30 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 179, 180
(2011).
125 Id. Dr. Gavett acknowledged that the results include a selection bias as the brains are
donated to the Center for study, and no randomized study has been conducted. Id. Using the
total number of professional football player deaths for that time period, Dr. Gavett estimated a
lifetime prevalence of CTE of 3.7%. Id.
126 Alan Schwarz, The Next Step for Researchers Is Not Finding Brain Trauma, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2011, at SP, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/sports/football/
08duerson.html?_r=0.
127 See, e.g., Helmet Injuries Hearings, supra note 96, at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert C.
Cantu) (noting that “not every athlete who experiences head trauma develops [CTE]”).
128 See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE (1998).
White played professional football for three seasons, playing for one year with the Pittsburgh
Pirates (now Steelers), id. at 97-122, and two with the Detroit Lions. Id. at 158-170. At $15,000,
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129

be diagnosed during a person’s lifetime. Unlike other diseases such
as Alzheimer’s, “[t]here are neither published and validated clinical
130
diagnostic criteria nor biomarkers” for CTE.
Indeed, researchers do not yet understand the underlying mecha131
nisms that cause the disease. Repeated brain trauma is just one risk
factor for CTE. A 2012 Study by the Center noted that “there are
numerous individuals with a history of repeated brain trauma who do
not have CTE upon neuropathological examination. Therefore, concussions and other brain trauma alone are not sufficient to cause the
132
disease.” “[O]ther factors, including duration of exposure to head
trauma, age at first exposure, gender, age, race, and genetic predisposi133
tion, may play a role in the development of CTE.” For example, in
congressional testimony, Dr. Robert Cantu noted that the Center had
identified “a case of CTE in a man who only played football at the
college level,” and concluded that “some of these individuals have
134
entered the NFL already with incipient, if not full-blown, CTE.”
135
Additionally, a player’s position could play a role. A recent study by
Dr. Everett Lehman at the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health found that players in “speed positions,” such as quarterbacks, running backs, wide receivers, and linebackers, had more than
three times the risk of dying from a neurodegenerative disease, such
as Alzheimer’s, than non-speed position players, such as defensive
136
lineman.
Moreover, although the research suggests that brain trauma is a
risk factor for CTE, “very little is known about what type, frequency,
or amount of trauma is necessary to induce the accumulation of these

White was the highest-paid player of his day. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, 462 (Clare Cushman ed. 1995). Another notable example is Associate
Justice Alan C. Page of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Law is the Mere
Continuation of Politics by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 423, 437-38 (2007). Before winning a seat on the Minnesota Supreme
Court in 1992, Page was a Hall of Fame defensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings in the
1960s and 1970s. Id.
129 Baugh, supra note 99, at 3, 6, 9.
130 Id. at 9.
131 Id. at 5-6.
132 Id. at 5.
133 Id. at 9.
134 Helmet Injuries Hearings, supra note 96, at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert C. Cantu).
135 Baugh, supra note 99, at 5; see also Everett J. Lehman et al., Neurodegenerative Causes of
Death Among Retired National Football League Players, 79 NEUROLOGY (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://www.neurology.org/content/early/2012/09/05/WNL.0b013e31826daf50. This difference reflects the different concussion rates experienced by the different positions:
“[C]oncussions most often occur while the player is making a tackle (43%), being tackled (23%),
blocking (20%), or being blocked (10%).” Cantu, supra note 15, at 53.
136 Lehman, supra note 135, at 3-4.
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137

pathological proteins.” Recent findings indicate that subconcussive
impact that does not result in any clinical symptoms may itself be suf138
ficient to initiate CTE.
Finally, not all football players with a history of concussions exhibit clinical signs of CTE. It may be that some players are resilient to
the disease for various reasons and may remain asymptomatic even
though their brains will show the tau proteins and other pathologies
139
140
that indicate CTE at death. As Dr. Ann C. McKee, co-director of
the Center explained, “[s]ome individuals who are intelligent and have
great capacity for rewiring their nervous system or taking different
routes to access the same information can have a lot of structural
141
damage without exhibiting any symptoms.”
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
To certify a class action, a plaintiff must satisfy the prerequisites
of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
142
adequate representation. Then, the class action must fit within one
of the categories of Rule 23(b), specifically either an injunctive class
143
under Rule 23(b)(2) or a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3).
144
Wal-Mart v. Dukes is the Supreme Court’s most recent class action decision. Wal-Mart involved “one of the most expansive class
145
In Wal-Mart, the district court certified a Rule
actions ever.”
23(b)(2) injunctive class of nearly 1.5 million current and former fe137 Brandon E. Gavett et al., Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Risk Factor for Neurodegeneration,
2:18
ALZHEIMER’S
RES.
&
THERAPY
1,
2
(2010),
available
at
http://alzres.com/content/pdf/alzrt42.pdf.
138 Baugh, supra note 99, at 5.
139 See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 126.
140 Dr. McKee has been described as “[t]he woman who would save football.” Jane Leavy,
The
Woman
Who
Would
Save
Football,
GRANTLAND
(Aug.
17,
2012),
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/8218700/neuropathologist-dr-ann-mckee-accused-killingfootball-be-sport-only-hope.
141 See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 126.
142 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). For a thorough discussion of the requirements to certify a class, see
1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS ch. 3 (4th ed. 2002).
143 Two categories are not relevant here. First, Rule 23(b)(1)(A) allows a class action where
the suit presents a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class.” “This category is somewhat opaque and rarely utilized.” 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:7 (4th ed. 2002). Second, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) also
permits a class action where “the judgment in a nonclass action, while not technically concluding
the rights of other members, might do so as a practical matter.” Id. The classic example of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action is the limited fund class action. See id.; see also Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (describing “‘limited fund’ cases . . . in which numerous
persons make claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims”).
144 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
145 Id. at 2547
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male employees of Wal-Mart who alleged that the company discrimi146
nated against them on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. The
147
class sought injunctive and equitable relief, including backpay. In
Wal-Mart, the Court clarified two things about class certification.
First, the Court clarified the meaning of “commonality” under Rule
148
23(a).
Second, the Court added to our understanding of when a
149
Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate.
A. Commonality After Wal-Mart v. Dukes
As a threshold requirement, Rule 23(a)(2) requires all class action plaintiffs to show that “there are questions of law or fact common
150
to the class.” In Wal-Mart, the Court noted that this “language is
easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint liter151
ally raises common ‘questions.’” Rather, the Court explained that
“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class
152
members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” The Court elaborated
that commonality requires a “common contention . . . that is capable
of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
153
of the claims in one stroke.” In short, commonality requires “com154
mon answers,” not merely common questions.
Applying this standard, the Court found that the case did not pre155
sent “even a single common question.” The Court noted that the
plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim was based on an alleged “pattern
or practice of discrimination” for “literally millions of employment
156
decisions.” The Court concluded that “[w]ithout some glue holding
the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that the examination of all the class members’ claims for
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I
157
disfavored.” In doing so, the Court emphasized that individual store
managers may have had various sex-neutral criteria for hiring and

146

Id.
Id. at 2547.
148 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-57.
149 Id. at 2557-61.
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
151 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131-32 (2009)).
152 Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2556.
156 Id. at 2552.
157 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
147
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158

promotion. Responding to the dissent’s criticism that the Court was
“blending” the commonality requirement with the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the Court explained that dissimilarities
159
were relevant to determining whether a common question existed.
B.

Rule 23(b)(2)

Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action where “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
160
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” In Wal-Mart,
the Court held that claims for individualized relief are not permitted
161
under Rule 23(b)(2).
As a threshold matter, the Court noted the defendant’s right to
162
raise any individual affirmative defenses. The Court explained that
“[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to
‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ a class cannot be
certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate
163
its statutory defenses to individual claims.” Under this reasoning, a
Rule 23(b)(2) class should not be certified where the defendant has
plaintiff-specific affirmative defenses.
Additionally, the Court subtly changed the mode of analysis for a
Rule 23(b)(2) class. Instead of analyzing whether the claim was “equi164
table” or legal in nature, the Court instead focused on the “indivisi165
ble nature” of the remedy. The Court explained:
Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.
It does not authorize class certification when each individual
class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it does not
authorize class certification when each class member would be
166
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.

158

Id. at 2555-56.
Id. at 2556.
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
161 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court left for another day whether Rule 23(b)(2)
prohibits any claim for monetary relief at all. Id.
162 Id. at 2561.
163 Id. (citations omitted).
164 E.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 481-82 (1997).
165 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; see also id. at 2560 (noting that it was “irrelevant” that
plaintiffs’ claim for back-pay was “equitable in nature”).
166 Id. at 2557.
159
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The Court noted that Rule 23(b)(2) lacked the procedural pro167
tections of Rule 23(b)(3), including the opportunity to opt-out of the
168
169
class action and the mandatory notice provisions of Rule 23(b)(3).
The Court explained that these protections were “unnecessary to a
(b)(2) class” because the relief of an “indivisible injunction” benefits
170
all class members at once. The assumption here is that the relief
benefits all class members equally, so that there should be no need for
any individualized or case-specific inquiries. Likewise, notice and optouts have “no purpose” where the indivisibility of the requested relief
171
assures that all class members benefit.
As an example, the Court
identified the challenges to racial segregation—“conduct that was
remedied by a single classwide order”—as the quintessential (b)(2)
172
cases.
This focus on the indivisible nature of the remedy can also be
seen in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. Under the ALI’s approach, “indivisible remedies,”
which are appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), “generally stand to benefit or otherwise affect all persons subject to the disputed policy or
173
practice.”
Rejecting an analysis that tried to categorize the re174
quested relief “along the law-equity divide,” the Principles instead
175
urged courts to look at the “practical operation of the remedy.” Specifically addressing medical monitoring class actions, the Principles
noted that “[e]ven when medical-monitoring claims are allowed, there
is no basis of aggregating claims that ultimately rely on individual con176
siderations to prove liability.”
Finally, reflecting the Court’s concerns about the lack of opt-out
opportunity in a (b)(2) class, many circuits require that a (b)(2) class
177
action demonstrate that the class’s claims are “cohesive.” The cohe167

Id. at 2558.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (allowing class members to opt-out of a (b)(3)
class action), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (failing to provide opt-out right to (b)(3) class
members).
169 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring damages class members to receive the
“best notice that is practicable under the circumstances”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (stating that for injunctive classes, notice is discretionary).
170 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
171 See id. at 2559.
172 Id. at 2557-58.
173 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04, at 117 (2010).
174 Id. at 119.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 121.
177 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 847 (5th Cir. 2012); Gates v. Rohm & Hass
Co., 655 F.3d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 2011); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1088, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010); Romberio v.
Unumprovident Corp., 385 Fed. Appx. 423, 433 (6th Cir. 2009); Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
168
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siveness requirement looks at whether individual issues prevent adju178
In Barnes v.
dication of the class’s claims on an aggregate basis.
American Tobacco Co., for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that cohesiveness requires that
the plaintiffs’ injuries must be “group, as opposed to individual inju179
Similar to the predominance inquiry in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
ries.”
action, the cohesiveness requirement focuses on a lack of individual180
ized issues.
C.

Rule 23(b)(3)

To certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), a proposed class
action must satisfy the elements of predominance and superiority.
First, a court must find that “the question of law or fact common to
the class members predominate over any questions affecting only in181
dividual members.” Second, the court must conclude “that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
182
adjudicating the controversy.” “In short, this analysis weighs individual issues against common issues: do the claims of the proposed
class involve facts or legal issues unique to each class member, or can
183
the issues be resolved on a class-wide basis?”
Both factual and legal differences can raise individual issues. In
terms of factual differences, the facts of exposure and each plaintiff’s
184
medical history may vary widely. In turn, “factual differences trans185
late into significant legal differences.” For example, differences in
exposure or injury can require disparate application of legal rules,
186
such as causation and comparative fault. Finally, in a national class
action, “variations in state law may swamp any common issues and
187
defeat predominance.” Because the court “must apply an individual543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008); Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, AFLCIO, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir.
1998); Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 253 F.R.D. 365, 371 (S.D. W. Va. 2008); Larsen v.
JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 235 F.R.D. 191, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Zehel-Miller v. Astrazeneca Pharm.,
LP, 223 F.R.D. 659, 664 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
178 E.g., Rowe v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 262 F.R.D. 451, 458 (D.N.J. 2009).
179 Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 n.18.
180 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:34 (4th ed.
2002).
181 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
182 Id.
183 Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Punitive
Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 883 (2008).
184 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742-43 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 741.
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ized choice of law analysis to each plaintiff’s claims, the proliferation
188
of disparate factual and legal issues is compounded exponentially.”
IV. CERTIFYING THE MEDICAL MONITORING CLASS ACTION
The personal injury class action no longer exists, at least in fed189
eral court. Recognizing this, the NFL Players have asserted only a
190
medical monitoring claim as part of the Master Class Complaint.
Although the Supreme Court has rejected a medical monitoring cause
191
of action under federal law for railroad workers exposed to asbestos,
state courts have struggled with this issue and the resulting “law of
192
medical monitoring” has little consistency from state to state. For
example, California has found that medical monitoring is simply a
193
type of compensatory damages, while Pennsylvania has recognized
194
medical monitoring as a “separate and distinct cause of action.” On
the other hand, Indiana does not recognize medical monitoring at
195
196
all. Louisiana requires a manifest physical or mental injury, while
Missouri has found a present injury requirement to be “inconsistent
197
with . . . the purpose of medical monitoring.”
Even within those states recognizing a claim for medical monitor198
ing, the elements vary. “Some courts have adopted a lesser standard
for evaluating how much of an increase in risk plaintiffs must show to
199
In addition, affirmative
trigger the medical monitoring remedy.”
defenses, such as comparative negligence principles, vary among juris200
dictions.
Apparently recognizing the problems posed by multiple state
laws, the NFL Players assert a medical monitoring claim under New
201
York law only. The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed
188

Id. at 742-43 n.15.
See generally NAGAREDA, supra note 8; see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “certification of mass tort litigation classes has been disfavored”).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
191 Metro-North Commuter R. R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
192 See In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 291-93 (N.D. Ohio 2007)
(surveying the law of medical monitoring). See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 22.74 (2004); Anderson, supra note 10.
193 E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823 (1993).
194 E.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing Pennsylvania law).
195 See, e.g., Johnson v. Abbott Labs., 2004 WL 3245947, at *6 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2004).
196 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315 (Supp. 2004).
197 See, e.g., Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. 2007).
198 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.74 (2004).
199 Id.
200 In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 292-93 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (noting
that comparative negligence principles differ in Pennsylvania and Utah).
201 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 234.
189
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the viability of a claim for medical monitoring, but the intermediate
appellate courts and federal district courts predicting New York law
consistently have allowed asymptomatic plaintiffs to bring a medical
202
monitoring claim. Still, “no New York intermediate appellate court
has carefully considered the elements of a claim for medical monitoring,” and federal courts have described these elements in slightly dif203
ferent terms. Using the most recent articulation of these elements
by a New York federal court, the NFL Players must plead:
(1) exposure at greater than background levels; (2) to a proven
hazardous substance; (3) caused by defendant’s tortious conduct;
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff faces an elevated risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring
procedure exists that makes early detection possible; (6) the
monitoring program is different that the program normally prescribed in the absence of exposure; and (7) the monitoring program is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scien204
tific principles.
Even assuming medical monitoring is a viable legal theory, allowing medical monitoring in the NFL-concussion litigation would expand the tort in new and novel directions. The NFL players do not
205
allege exposure to “a proven hazardous substance,” but rather assert
that the “repeated traumatic head impact injuries . . . experienced by
206
Plaintiffs and members of the Class” satisfy this element.
But, putting aside the substance of the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim, a procedural question has vexed courts confronting these
claims: Is medical monitoring a claim for injunctive relief or a claim
207
for damages? In other words, should a medical monitoring claim be
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or Rule
23(b)(3)? Courts are split on the proper approach to medicalmonitoring class actions and the viability of class treatment under ei208
ther (b)(2) or (b)(3). The various complaints filed against the NFL
reflect this split in treatment with some asserting claims under (b)(2),

202 See e.g., Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2011 WL 338425, at *5-7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2011) (discussing New York law).
203 Id. at *7.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 236.
207 Compare Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing courtsupervised medical monitoring program as “paradigmatic request for injunctive relief” but denying certification on other grounds), with Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1196
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding creation of medical monitoring fund was claim for monetary damages).
208 See sources cited supra note 207.
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some using (b)(3), and others cautiously covering both bases and in209
voking both (b)(2) and (b)(3).
A. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)
National medical monitoring class actions, such as the one proposed in the Master Complaint, usually fail the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) on two grounds. First, individual issues,
such as health history, frequency of exposure, causation, and the pro210
posed treatment plan, dwarf any common issues. Here, causation
certainly poses individual questions; each plaintiff will have to show
that his brain damage resulted from concussions sustained while playing in the NFL, rather than genetic predisposition or concussions re211
ceived while playing football in college or even high school. Moreover, numerous courts have found that the element requiring that the
monitoring program be different than one normally prescribed poses
212
individual issues. Indeed, the very risk of developing CTE will vary
213
from player to player and may depend on the position played. Simi214
larly, affirmative defenses, such as comparative negligence or as215
sumption of the risk, pose individual issues. Indeed, the NFL surely
will argue that brain damage from concussions is part of the accepted
risk of professional football.
Second, the variations in state law concerning the viability and
elements of a medical monitoring claim prevent certification of a na216
tionwide class action. Although plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this
problem by requesting that only New York law apply to the class, this
217
request runs afoul of Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. Shutts held that
every state has an interest in having its law applied to the claims of its
218
residents. Because plaintiffs are from all fifty states, all fifty state
laws likely apply to the proposed class action. But, not all fifty states

209

See discussion supra part I.A.
See generally 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:47 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the
application of the predominance requirement to medical monitoring claims).
211 See text accompanying supra notes 133-34.
212 E.g., Barnes, 161 F.3d at 146; Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 489 (E.D. Pa.
1997).
213 See discussion accompanying supra notes 135-36.
214 See, e.g., Lewallen v. Medtronic USA, Inc., 2002 WL 31300899, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(denying (b)(3) class action and identifying comparative fault defense as individual issue).
215 See, e.g., Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., 2001 WL 290603, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting
assumption of the risk defense poses individual issue).
216 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996); see also 1
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:47 (8th ed. 2011).
217 See 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
218 Id. at 819-21.
210
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even recognize a claim for medical monitoring. In short, a national
class action under Rule 23(b)(3) is not viable for the NFL Players.
B.

Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2)

Because the majority of courts have denied class certification of
220
medical monitoring claims under Rule 23(b)(3), the NFL Players
221
have turned to Rule 23(b)(2). Numerous courts, however, have denied class certification of medical monitoring claims under Rule
222
223
23(b)(2) for a lack of cohesiveness. In Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
for example, the Third Circuit noted that “medical monitoring classes
may founder for lack of cohesion . . . because causation and medical
224
necessity often require individual proof.”
Similarly, in In re St. Jude
225
Medical, Inc., the Eighth Circuit concluded that “each plaintiff’s
need (or lack of need) for medical monitoring is highly individual226
ized.” Considering a proposed medical monitoring claim for a class
of heart valve recipients, the court noted that whether medical monitoring was necessary depended on “the patient’s medical history, the
condition of the patient’s heart valves at the time of implantation, the
patients risk factors for heart valve complications, the patient’s gen227
eral health, the patient’s personal choice, and other factors.”
In short, the same individual issues that doom the (b)(3) medical
monitoring class, such as causation and exposure levels, likewise create
228
cohesiveness problems under (b)(2). The NFL Players will have an
uphill battle demonstrating cohesion for a national medical monitoring class based on the risk of concussions. As Dr. Baugh has ex229
plained, the mechanism for CTE is unclear. Concussions alone are
230
insufficient to cause the disease.
Accordingly, individual factors,
such as “duration of exposure to head trauma, age at first exposure,
231
gender, age, race and genetic predisposition” would need to be examined to determine whether a specific plaintiff faces an elevated risk
of developing CTE. Likewise, pre-existing concussion damage from

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
See sources cited in 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:47 (8th ed. 2011).
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
E.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 264.
425 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1122.
Id.
E.g., Gates, 655 F.3d at 264-65.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
See Baugh, supra note 99, at 5.
Id. at 9.
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232

college or high school play will need to be eliminated as a cause.
Additionally, under Wal-Mart, the NFL must be able to present casespecific defenses, such as assumption of the risk and comparative
233
fault. Finally, given the lack of any treatment options or even mark234
ers for diagnosing CTE, any proposed monitoring plan cannot be in
the nature of an “indivisible remedy.” Given the infancy of the science
in this area, it is difficult to imagine a proposed series of medical tests
that would equally benefit all class members at once.
CONCLUSION
Medical monitoring claims generally do not present the type of
“indivisible” claim described in Wal-Mart as appropriate under Rule
23(b)(2). If the idea under Wal-Mart is that case-specific inquiries are
unnecessary because the relief benefits all class members equally,
medical monitoring claims fail by definition. The elements of causation and medical necessity require consideration of case-specific facts,
such as frequency and magnitude of exposure, an individual’s medical
history, as well as the individual risks and safety of undergoing a moni235
toring program. Thus, liability turns on the specific facts of each
class member’s claimed exposure. Only where the identical risk of
harm is shared among the class can a medical monitoring claim be
considered “indivisible” in nature.
Moreover, under Wal-Mart, it is questionable that the Master
Complaint presents a question capable of a common answer. The
Master Complaint asserts that liability, affirmative defenses, medical
necessity, the standards of routine medical care for men of similar age,
236
and treatment present common questions. Apart from the standard
of routine medical care, however, each one of these questions requires
an individual answer, not a common answer. At the end of the day,
should the Master Complaint survive the NFL’s pending motion to
237
dismiss, class certification of the medical monitoring class should be
denied.

232

See Helmet Injuries Hearings, supra note 96, at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert Cantu).
See text accompanying supra notes 160-61.
234 See supra Part II.
235 See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 2011).
236 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 22.
237 Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League and NFL Properties
LLC In Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint on Preemption Grounds, In re National Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No.
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 3589.
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